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Abstract
A partial ownership held by a downstream rm creates a perceived cost asymmetry
towards its competitors. In this article, it is shown that this will have a negative impact
on the sustainability of a collusive scenario. This is a similar result to natural di¤erences
in production costs of rms. However, this participation makes it so it is more likely
to be the most ecient rm to deviate, and not the least one, as in natural assymetry.
The existance of participation never makes collusion easier to sustain than its absence.
This also creates a tool for the upstream rm to break, or incentivate, joint downstream
decision-making, as it may also be used to increase its directed demand. Similarly, this
tool can be used by a regulator to increase welfare by avoiding market concentration.
Resumo
Uma participação parcial detida por uma empresa a jusante cria uma as-
simetria de custos perante os seus concorrentes. Neste artigo mostra-se que
isto terá um impacto negativo na sustentabilidade de um cenário de conluio.
Isto é um resultado semelhante a uma diferença natural nos custos de pro-
dução das empresas. Contudo, esta participação faz com que seja a empresa
mais eciente a mais provável de desviar da situação, em vez da menos e-
ciente, como em assimetria natural. A existência da participação nunca torna
o conluio mais sustentável do que a sua ausência. Isto também cria uma ferra-
mente à empresa a montante para quebrar, ou incentivar, a decisão conjunta
a jusante. Do mesmo modo, esta ferramenta pode ser usada por um regulador
para aumentar o bem estar, quebrando o conluio.
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In several vertical industries, downstream rms partially own an upstream input supplier.
This partial backward integration may be a mere nancial interest or may involve some degree
of control. Greenlee and Raskovich (2006) have focused on passive partial vertical ownership
(PVO), that is characterized by the downstream rms having claims on upstream prots that
involve no degree of control with respect to the upstream rms decisions. In this setting,
a downstream rm is, in fact, paying part of the input price to herself. This will have some
impact on the equilibrium of the downstream competition stage. Greenlee and Raskovich (2006)
analyze how the downstream rms input/output choice is a¤ected by di¤erent ownership
patterns and establish that, under uniform ownership, PVO would have no e¤ects.
Similarly to what happens in a horizontal merger framework, it is likely that PVO has other
e¤ects in addition to these unilateral ones. In particular, it is likely that there are also some
coordinated e¤ects involved. These e¤ects refer to the possibility that downstream collusion,
explicit or tacit, may be more or less easy to sustain in the presence of PVO. The purpose of this
paper is to analyze how PVO without control a¤ects downstream collusion and to incorporate
these e¤ects in the upstream decisions.
We model the industry downstream as an homogeneous product duopoly, that needs to
purchase an input from an upstream monopolist, which may be regulated or not. One of
the downstream rms is assumed to own a percentage of the upstream producer and therefore
receive a percentage of its prot. These assumptions resemble closely the Portuguese electricity
industry where REN, Redes Energéticas Nacionais, is an energy transmission operator with two
major business areas: the transmission of electricity at very high voltage and the transport
of high-pressure natural gas. One of the ve larger shareholders of REN is the EDP group, a
vertically integrated generator, distributor and supplier of electricity in Portugal who is also
one of its clients. The downstream industry is relatively concentrated and the access conditions
to the transmission network are regulated.
This paper is related to several strands of literature. Firstly, it is related to the literature
on PVO, with or without control, that includes the above mentioned Greenlee and Raskovich
(2006). Chen and Ross (2003) and Rossini and Vergari (2011) analyze the case of Input
Production Joint Ventures owned in equal parts by duopolists where some degree of control is
present. The rst nd that, under some assumptions, this joint venture may lead to the same
outcomes as a full merger between the downstream rms. Rossini and Vergari (2011) analyze
an oligopoly with di¤erentiated goods and nd conditions for these joint ventures to exist and
nd that rmsincentives may reduce welfare.
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Secondly, it shares some modelling assumptions with the literature that analyzes the uni-
lateral e¤ects of partial interests in competitors or in production joint ventures, that is, partial
horizontal ownership. Flath (1992), using Cournot industries where competitors own partic-
ipations on each other, nds that "e¤ects of horizontal shareholding interlocks are greater if
rms are mindful of indirect shareholding links than if only attentive to direct links". Bresna-
han and Salop (1986), who analyze di¤erent types of arrangements for joint ventures, conclude
that the incentives of the competing rms depend on the type of nancial interest and control
arrangements. They propose a Modied Herndahl-Hirshman Index to quantify these incen-
tives. OBrien and Salop (2000) state that it might happen that partial investments raise even
larger concerns than full control. Similar to the previous article quoted, they consider several
arrangements of nancial interest and of control.
Both strands of literature above do not consider the e¤ects of partial ownership on collusion.
Gilo et al. (2006) discuss such e¤ects, but for the case of horizontal ownership. They nd
necessary and su¢ cient conditions for which these arrangements facilitate collusion. Using a
Bertrand oligopoly with n rms, they are able to prove that an increase in the participation
between rivals never hinders collusion and that it may facilitate it. Foros et al. (2010) use
a three rms Cournot game to nd that a partial cross ownership with control might lead to
higher joint prots than full merger. Malueg (1992) shows that "if rms interact repeatedly,
then increasing cross ownership may reduce the likelihood of collusion. A high level of cross
ownership may even entail a lower likelihood of collusion than would no cross ownership."
The main conclusions of this article are the following. Similarly to asymmetry, PVO makes
collusion less likely to be sustained. However, contrary to the case of natural asymmetry be-
tween rms, it will be the most e¢ cient rm the one with higher incentives to deviate. Just like
under natural asymmetry, PVO imposes an upper bound on the price of the intermediate good
for collusion to be sustainable. On the contrary, if there are e¢ ciency gains from distributing
production between the downstream rms, which can be caused by factors such as increasing
marginal costs or di¤erentiated goods, collusion might be more sustainable under PVO for an
additional set of higher prices of the intermediate good. It is also concluded that the upstream
rm might have an incentive to charge a di¤erent price to its buyers (the downstream rms)
in order to prevent collusion. However, if there are gains from e¢ ciency in having production
distributed between rms, it may happen the opposite: that the rm upstream would choose
a di¤erent price to encourage collusion. Finally, it could be shown that, from a social welfare
perspective, it might be optimal to choose a price for the intermediate good above marginal
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the analysis of the incentives for downstream collusion under PVO is provided. The rst result
is that PVO creates asymmetry between rms, as the ones that have a participation in the
supplier receive part of their costs back. This asymmetry makes collusion more unlikely to be
sustained. This result is similar to that obtained for the case of natural di¤erences between
rms costs structures, but it changes which rm has the most incentives to deviate. Under
PVO, this will be the most e¢ cient rm, while under natural cost asymmetry, it would be
the least e¢ cient one. A more e¢ cient rm has a higher incentive to deviate from a collusive
scenario since its e¢ ciency is not totally reected when rms are maximizing joint prots.
There is, however, another major di¤erence between natural asymmetry and the one caused by
PVO. If there are total e¢ ciency gains from colluding, a rm that owns a part of the upstream
rm may indirectly benet in this scenario from such gains, thus creating a new possibility for
sustainable collusion.
The existence of this ownership creates a new tool for the upstream rm. Besides impacting
its prots by the normal e¤ects on demand, the price that this rm sets may also change
whether downstream rms will collude or not. This tool can be used to break downstream
collusion as that scenario provides, in general, a lower demand for the intermediate product
that the upstream rm is selling. The tool, however, may also be used to create such joint
prot maximization, which might be the optimal choice if there are su¢ cient e¢ ciency gains
from the distribution of production between downstream rms.
Finally, this tool may also be benecial in the case of a regulated market, such as, typically,
energy grids or telecommunications. A regulator may use the price of the intermediate good
di¤erently from what is usually considered the best option in a static environment (the marginal
cost). It may be better to have a su¢ ciently high price of such good that avoids collusion, even
if it increases the double marginalization problem.
This analysis abstracted from some important issues of PVO. The rst is the inexistence of
control. In many cases, this integration structure may provide partial or total control to the
downstream rm. A second is to make the participation share endogenous. In this framework,
the ownership was not chosen by the downstream rms. New issues would be raised, were
it an endogenous decision, such as whether it would compensate to change the participation
just to make collusion sustainable. Finally, di¤erentiated prices for the intermediate product
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